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NCAA PENALTIES: CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR COACHES AND PRESIDENTS
James Hopkins*
INTRODUCTION
Innocent student athletes missed tournament basketball last spring. University
presidents, trying to minimize damages after alleged violations of National Collegiate Athletic
Association ("NCAA") rules, voluntarily pulled entire teams out of tournament play. 2  The
basketball programs of Fresno State University ("Fresno State") 3 and the University of Georgia
("Georgia") both had their tournament play cancelled by their presidents.4 Guilty athletes were
punished for violations, but often at the expense of their innocent teammates.5 The presidents
and coaches, authority figures presumably accountable, were not truly penalized for their roles in
the alleged violations. 6 The authority figure closest to receiving a penalty is usually the coach.
However, at Georgia this only resulted in a paid suspension of the men's basketball coach, Jim
Harrick, followed by Harrick's resignation and a sizeable settlement on his salary.7 Even with
Jim Harrick resigning from Georgia, he will probably not have too much trouble landing another
lucrative contract with another university.8
The practice of penalizing an institution by suspending tournament play is the brainchild
of the NCAA. 9 The presidents of Georgia and Fresno State pulled their basketball programs out
of tournament play in an effort to make a statement to the NCAA and maybe lessen NCAA
penalties down the road.' 0 The NCAA's enforcement structure encourages tough penalties for
athletes, but fails to hold accountable the authority figures that are directly responsible for the
integrity of the athletic programs." The NCAA could foster integrity much more efficiently if a
corporate accountability approach were utilized.12
* J.D. Candidate 2005, DePaul University College of Law, Chicago, Illinois.
'Brian Skoloff, Fresno State Not Allowed in WAC Tournament, (March 4, 2003), at
http://www.collegesports.com/sports/m-baskbl/stories/030403acq.html (last visited February 8, 2004).2 Id
3 Id
4 Dan Wetzel, Harrick, Georgia, SEC Have Checkered Past, (March 10, 2003), at
http://www.sportsline.com/collegebasketball/story/6243000 (last visited February 8, 2004).
SId.
6 Mark Schlabach, Harrick Resigns Under Cloud of NCAA Investigation, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION
(ajc.com), March 27, 2003, at http://www.ajc.com/sports/content/sports/uga/0303/28harrick.html (last visited
February 8, 2004).
7 Id
Wetzel, supra note 4.
' NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 2002-03 NCAA Div. I MANUAL at art. 19.4.2.2
(2002) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
10 Andy Katz, Sources: ADs Vote to Ban Fresno from WAC Tourney, (March 3, 2003), at
http://espn.go.com/ncb/columns/katz andy/1517649.html (last visited February 8, 2004).
11 Mark Eytcheson, Controversy Surrounds Fresno State Basketball, The Insiders.com, (November 25, 2002), at
http://fresnostate.theinsiders.com/2/78218.html (last visited February 8, 2004).
12 Model Penal Code § 2.07 (2001) (defming corporate accountability).
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Part II of this comment will focus on the NCAA's mission and penalties for NCAA
violations. The situations at Georgia and Fresno State will be used to emphasize problems with
the penalties currently used in the NCAA. Part III will discuss how coaches and university
presidents are responsible for adhering to NCAA regulations. The situations at Georgia and
Fresno State will be used to shed light on this issue. Part IV will discuss the current status of
court involvement in NCAA regulations. Part V will include a discussion of corporate
accountability and its applicability to the NCAA's mission, regulations, and enforcement
process. Part VI will provide a brief conclusion and offer suggestions on how corporately aimed
penalties would comply with the mission of the NCAA.
II. THE NCAA MISSION AND PENALTIES
A. The NCAA Mission
The NCAA was formed in order to "maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part
of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so
doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports."13  This quote from the NCAA's constitution is better known as the goal of
"amateurism." 14  "Amateurism" is embodied in the efforts of the NCAA to foster a non-
professional atmosphere with athletics being part of the student athlete's education.'5
Maintaining "amateurism" is the most significant part of the NCAA's mission.1 The NCAA
sees itself as part of higher education and works to maintain an educational role.' 7 The NCAA
also focuses on maintaining a "level playing field" where all teams within a division can be
competitive.8 However, "amateurism" is the ultimate focus of the NCAA's mission with the
latter goals serving to advance the goal of "amateurism." 19
The NCAA's constitution does not provide the entire agenda of the NCAA, which is also
affected by the big business of college sports.20 Multi-billion dollar television contracts for the
NCAA men's basketball tournament and bowl games are just two of the ways the NCAA creates
revenue. 21 This revenue raises the competitive stakes for colleges and universities who can
receive payouts in the millions of dollars from the NCAA for participating in NCAA
tournaments or bowl games.22 With multi-million dollar payouts on the line, the motivation for
institutions to cut corners in efforts to become competitive has greatly increased.23 In response,
the NCAA has grown into a major regulatory body with a 400 page plus rules manual.24
Maintaining "amateurism" is much more complicated in the high stakes world of today's college
13 2002-03 NCAA Manual, Const., art. 1.3.1 (2002).
14 Gary R. Roberts, Resolution of Disputes in Intercollegiate Athletics, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 431, 432 (2001)
(discussing the mission of the NCAA).
15 Id.
6[d
'I
18 Id.
19 2002-03 NCAA Manual, Const., art. 1.3.1 (2002).
20 Roberts, supra note 14 (discussing the affect of large contracts on the NCAA).
211d
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Kevin E. Broyles, NCAA Regulation of Intercollegiate Athletics: Time for a New Game Plan, 46 ALA. L. REV.
487, 490-510 (1995) (discussing problems with NCAA regulation procedures).
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sports. 25 The NCAA now acts as investigator, prosecutor and adjudicator to enforce the many
new rules it has passed in an effort to discourage violations and maintain "amateurism." 26
B. NCAA Penalties
There are numerous penalty options listed in the NCAA Manual, but most focus on
penalizing the institution as opposed to individuals.27  Ineligibility for NCAA tournaments,
ineligibility for invitational and postseason play and prohibition of season competition are just
three penalties the NCAA can employ for violations. 28 The NCAA requires minimum penalties
to be assessed for violations.29 Among the minimum penalties is preclusion from one year of
postseason play. 30 Although NCAA penalties generally focus on institutions, there are penalty
options specifically referring to staff and coaches. 3 1 The NCAA does not directly penalize the
staff or coaches of an institution, but does promise further institutional penalties if the institution
does not suitably penalize its own personnel.32 The NCAA Manual defines suitable penalties for
institutional personnel as termination, suspension or reassignment. 33 The NCAA places a burden
on the institutions to show that they have properly penalized their personnel and reserves the
right to determine if a penalty is suitable in each situation.34  Punishment for institutional
personnel is part of the minimum penalty package.35 Penalties addressing the accountability of
university presidents are missing, however.36
C. Georgia and Fresno State: Problems with NCAA Penalties
There are two problems with NCAA penalties. 37 First, NCAA penalties do not guarantee
that the guilty parties receive punishment and often punish innocent parties.3 8 Second, NCAA
penalties do not sufficiently hold authority figures accountable. 39
25 Roberts, supra note 14 (discussing the affect of large contracts on the NCAA).
26 Broyles, supra note 24, at 491-498 (discussing the NCAA regulatory structure).
27 2002-03 NCAA Manual, art. 19.4.2.1 (2002).
28 Id. Other possible penalties include: probation of an institution, reprimand and censure of an institution,
ineligibility for television spots, ineligibility to vote and serve on NCAA committees, prohibition of recruitment,
reduction of financial aid awards for recruitment, return of monetary rewards to NCAA, vacation of team or
individual records, requiring the institution to recertify with NCAA, and revoking membership of an institution.
29 2002-03 NCAA Manual, art. 19.4.2.2 (2002).
30Id. Other minimum penalties include: two years of probation for the institution, one year of
prohibition of expense-paid recruiting visits for the sport being penalized, prohibition of off-
campus recruitment activities of all staff or coaches in the penalized sport for one year, television
sanctions for one year in the penalized sport, requirement that institution terminate, suspend or
reassign all guilty staff or coaches, and recertification of the institution with NCAA.
3 2002-03 NCAA Manual, art. 19.4.2.1 (2002).
32 Id.
3
I3 d.
I4 d.
2002-03 NCAA Manual, art. 19.4.2.2 (2002).
36 2002-03 NCAA Manual, art. 19.4.2.1 (2002).
Eytcheson, supra note 11.
38 Id.
39 [d
181
Vol. 1: 2 2003
Georgia's and Fresno State's basketball programs were accused of NCAA violations
during the 2002-03 season.40 The NCAA ultimately conducted investigations into both programs,
but the presidents of both schools already penalized their programs by pulling the teams out of
any post-season play.41 Three Georgia players allegedly received phony grades without ever
attending class.42  Three Fresno State players allegedly had "17 pieces of course work"
completed by another student.43  The alleged violations involved less than half of Georgia's
current players, but the entire team missed the regional tournament and what would have been a
guaranteed trip to the NCAA tournament.44 The Fresno State violations were alleged to have
occurred in 2000 and involved none of the 2002-03 roster, but the team was still barred from
post-season play.45 Penalties that prohibit participation of an entire team definitely punish the
innocent along with the guilty and sometimes only the innocent.46 Prohibition of team play
punishes the program and institution by refusing them the chance to earn the payouts available in
post-season play,47 but also unfairly hurts innocent staff and athletes in the program.48 Results,
such as those just mentioned, are unfair and call for the NCAA to reform its penalty process.49
The second problem with NCAA penalties, a lack of accountability for authority figures,
is emphasized by the absence of penalties for institution presidents. 50 The situations at Georgia
and Fresno State are examples of misallocated penalties.1 Georgia's president, Michael Adams,
approved a class by the title of "Coaching Strategies in Basketball" for the curriculum. 52 The
class was taught by assistant coach Jim Harrick Jr., the son of head coach Jim Harrick.53 The
class was less than academic and student athletes received high grades without ever attending
class.54 Adams ignored Harrick's questionable employment record and focused on Harrick's
impressive win record when he hired Harrick in 1999.55 Adams disregarded Georgia's bias
policies and allowed Harrick to hire his son as assistant coach.56 Although Adams created the
hazardous situation at Georgia by hiring a coach with a dubious history and bending the rules, it
was the players who were penalized.
40 Andy Katz, NCAA Sends Message to Violators... Via Michigan, (May 8, 2003), at
http://espn.go.com/ncb/columns/katz andy/1551123.html (last visited February 8, 2004).
41 id.
42 Jack Carey, Georgia Fires Jim Harrick Jr.; Dad Awaits Fate, USA TODAY, (March 6, 2003), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/mensbasketball/sec/2003-03-05-georgia-harrick-jr x.htm
(last visited February 8, 2004).
43 Skoloff, supra note 1.
44 Carey, supra note 42.
45 Skoloff, supra note 1.
46 Eytcheson, supra note 11.
47 2002-03 NCAA Manual, art. 19.4.2.1 (2002).
48 Eytcheson, supra note 11.
49 d.
50 2002-03 NCAA Manual, art. 19.4.2.1 (2002).
5i The penalties were self-administered at Georgia and Fresno State, but it is clear there was an effort to reflect
standard NCAA penalties.
Id.
52 Carey, supra note 42.
53 Carey, supra note 42.54 [d.
5 Wetzel, supra note 4 (discussing Harrick's resignation from the University of Rhode Island amid accusations of
sexual harassment and grade tampering, and prior recruiting indiscretions and expense account fraud at UCLA
which resulted in Harrick being fired).
56 Carey, supra note 42.
Wetzel, supra note 4.
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The lack of accountability for authority figures is also emphasized by NCAA penalties
for coaches that often result in termination, but do not prohibit coaches from signing new
contracts with other schools.58 John Welty, Fresno State president, hired Jerry Tarkanian as
men's basketball coach despite Tarkanian's controversial history.59 Welty knew that Tarkanian
was one the most controversial basketball coaches in the NCAA, but he also knew that
Tarkanian's teams made it to the NCAA tournament on a regular basis.6 0 Tarkanian is gone and
Fresno State is dealing with academic violations that occurred prior to Tarkanian's retirement.61
Tarkanian retired not long after Fresno State and the NCAA started a joint investigation into
academic fraud violations.62 Jim Harrick resigned from Georgia with a $250,000 contract
settlement.63 However, there is nothing to stop a Tarkanian or a Harrick from being hired by
another program just as Harrick was hired by Georgia despite being fired from UCLA for ethical
issues. 64 The NCAA encourages termination of guilty coaches, but does nothing to prevent
another institution from hiring those coaches. 65  Coaches are directly responsible for
orchestrating their program's adherence to NCAA rules, but the players are the ones left behind
and penalized while coaches are allowed to search for another lucrative contract.66
III. INVOLVEMENT OF PRESIDENTS AND COACHES
A. Involvement
Coaches and institution presidents shoulder much of the responsibility regarding NCAA
regulations.67 There is no question that coaches are directly involved in issues relating to NCAA
adherence. Additionally, institution presidents have also become intricately involved in
supervising their athletic programs. 68  In the mid 1980's, institution presidents formed the
Presidents Commission in response to mounting problems in college sports and the NCAA.69 By
the mid 1990's institution presidents had changed the structure of the NCAA with the addition of
the Executive Committee and the Board of Directors for each division. 70 These governing
bodies largely control the NCAA and both include institution presidents. 7 As a result, institution
presidents are closely involved with athletic programs and with the NCAA.72
5'2002-03 NCAA Manual, art. 19.4.2.1 (2002).
59 Eytcheson, supra note 11.
60 d
61 Id.
62 id.
6, Schlabach, supra note 6.
64 Wetzel, supra note 4.
65 2002-03 NCAA Manual, art. 19.4.2.1 (2002).
66 Wetzel, supra note 4.
67 Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association's Role in Regulating
Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 9, 16-17 (2000) (discussing the increasing role of institution
presidents in the NCAA).
68 Id.
69 d
70
71 id.
72 [d.
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As noted above, the presidents of Georgia and Fresno State made questionable hiring
decisions when they hired Jim Harrick and Jerry Tarkanian.73  Georgia president, Michael
Adams, certified a phony class for the curriculum.74 Adams also relaxed Georgia's bias policies
allowing Harrick to hire his son, who taught the phony class.75 NCAA presidents and coaches
are in a position to act as guardians of integrity and ensure adherence to NCAA rules.76 This
causes one to question why institution presidents are not held accountable when athletic
programs violate NCAA rules.n St. Bonaventure University's board of trustees requested the
resignation of President Robert Wickenheiser upon evidence that Wickenheiser approved
admission of a student athlete who had a welding certificate instead of an actual degree. The
action taken against Wickenheiser is fair and effective, but is not the norm and is not encouraged
by the NCAA.79
B. Conflict ofInterests
Institution presidents are responsible for their institutions' compliance with NCAA rules,
but the institution presidents also serve on the NCAA's most powerful governing bodies, the
Executive Committee and the Board of Directors.o This creates a conflict of interests as the
institution presidents operate the organization that monitors their compliance.8 1 Conflicting
interests are also apparent in the conflicting functions that institution presidents perform. 82
Institution presidents are expected to make their institutions and athletic programs profitable,
which conflicts with their role of supervising adherence with NCAA rules. 83  Conflicting
interests when coupled with penalties that ignore the most responsible authority figures raise
serious questions about the effectiveness of NCAA penalty options. 84
IV. COURT INVOLVEMENT
Before 1982, the courts generally held that the NCAA engaged in state action and was
thus accountable to constitutional scrutiny and judicial oversight.85  However, in 1982 the
Supreme Court handed down three decisions that significantly altered the state action analysis
73 Wetzel, supra note 4.
74 Carey, supra note 42.
75 d.
76 Smith, supra note 67 (discussing the increasing role of institution presidents in the NCAA).
77 Eytcheson, supra note 11.
78 Katz, supra note 40.
79 Eytcheson, supra note 11.
s0 Smith, supra note 67 (discussing the increasing role of institution presidents in the NCAA).
si Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Eytcheson, supra note 11.
85 Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977); Associated Students v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir.
1974); Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 422 F. Supp. 1158 (D. Minn. 1976), rev'd, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. dism'd, 434 U.S. 978 (1977); Pavey v. University of Alaska, 490 F. Supp. 1011 (D. Alaska 1980);
Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885 (D. Colo. 1976), affd, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978); Parish, 361 F.
Supp. 1214 (W.D. La. 1973), affd in part, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975); Howard Univ., 367 F. Supp. 926, affd,
510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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for the NCAA. 86 Following the Supreme Court's redefined stance on state action, the courts
began to classify the NCAA as a private actor and greatly curtailed constitutional scrutiny and
judicial oversight for the NCAA. The courts have also held that antitrust laws do not apply to
the NCAA.88 In National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd Of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.89 the
Supreme Court noted that it is rational to assume the regulations of the NCAA promote
competition rather than stifle it because the public interest in college sports is increased by the
NCAA's controls on commercialism. 90 Currently there is general legal deference to the NCAA's
structure and procedures. 9 1 The deference by the courts will probably continue until the courts'
perception of the NCAA as private and integral part of higher education changes.92 Meanwhile,
the NCAA will have to struggle with effectively governing itself and its member institutions
without direction from the legal system.93
V. CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: APPLICABILITY TO THE NCAA
A. Corporate Accountability
Corporate accountability is a widely accepted legal doctrine that allows corporations to
be held accountable for crimes that were committed by employees of the corporation. 94 The
corporate accountability doctrine (the "doctrine") also provides accountability for chief operating
officers and presidents of corporations for crimes committed under their supervision. 95 The
Model Penal Code lists three tiers of corporate accountability with different components in each
tier, but the theory behind the doctrine is the key for NCAA purposes. 96 The basis for corporate
accountability is the belief that the management figures will become motivated to exercise due
diligence in efforts to avoid criminal behavior of their employees if the management figures can
be held personally accountable. 97 If the NCAA hopes to motivate coaches and institution
presidents to exercise due diligence, then the NCAA penalties need to have a corporate aim.98
8 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
See, e.g., Arlosoroff v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021 (4th Cir. 1984); McCormack v.
NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1346 (5th Cir. 1988); Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953, 958 (6th Cir. 1986); McHale v.
Cornell Univ., 620 F. Supp. 67, 69 (N.D.N.Y. 1985); National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179,
199 (1988).
" See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Smith v.
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 139 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 1998); Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 977
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
89 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984).
90 Id.
91 Roberts, supra note 14 (discussing court involvement with the NCAA).
92 [d.
93 Id.
94 Model Penal Code § 2.07 (2001).
9 Id.
96 d
9 Id.
98 Wetzel, supra note 4.
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B. Applicability to the NCAA
As noted above, the mission of the NCAA is dominated by a commitment to
"amateurism." 99 The NCAA generates billions of dollars in revenue on a yearly basis that is
shared among member institutions.100 The penalty process in the NCAA lacks effective
corporate punishment, 01 which has fostered a proliferation of profit-motivated decisions by
coaches and institution presidents.102 It seems that using a corporate accountability approach to
enforce NCAA rules is appropriate for three reasons. First, corporate accountability is applicable
to the NCAA's mission of "amateurism." Second, the NCAA has become a for-profit
organization and needs corporate penalties to balance the conflict of interests this has created.
Lastly, a corporate accountability approach would create penalties for authority figures and
institutions that are not currently available.
Holding authority figures accountable via corporate penalties will ultimately facilitate the
mission of the NCAA. The focus of the NCAA mission is to "maintain intercollegiate athletics
as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student
body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and
professional sports," or to maintain "amateurism."1 03 The function of athletics as part of a
student athlete's education is a major component of "amateurism." 04 Corporate accountability
would place liability for following NCAA rules on the shoulders of the coaches and institution
presidents. These same shoulders bear the burden of maintaining integrity, academic and
otherwise, in athletic programs. Institution presidents and coaches are in an excellent position to
prevent NCAA violations. "Amateurism" would be facilitated by increasing the motivation of
the people with most power to influence adherence to NCAA rules.
The second point of applicability is that the NCAA has become a for-profit corporation
which has introduced a conflict of interests into higher education. 0 5 The NCAA creates billions
of dollars in revenue each year via television contracts for NCAA events.' 06 Payouts in the
millions of dollars are given to member institutions that compete in NCAA tournaments and
bowl games.107 The big business of college sports and the academic mission of higher education
do not compliment one another. The former dictates finding the surest way to make money and
the latter emphasizes academic excellence. Institution presidents are caught in the middle of this
conflict.
The structure of the NCAA is similar to that of a corporation.108 The NCAA is governed
by the NCAA Council, 109 which entails a president, secretary-treasurer, and forty-four
institutional representatives. 0 The NCAA Council has power to make NCAA policy and
interpret the constitution and bylaws of the NCAA.11' The NCAA Council also supervises the
99 Roberts, supra note 14 (discussing the mission of the NCAA).
00 Id.
101 2002-03 NCAA Manual, art. 19.4.2.1 (2002).
102 Katz, supra note 40.
103 2002-03 NCAA Manual, Const., art. 1.3.1 (2002).
104 Roberts, supra note 14 (discussing the mission of the NCAA).
105 Id.
106 id
107 id
108 Broyles, supra note 24 (discussing problems with NCAA regulatory procedures).
109 2002-03 NCAA Manual, Const., art. 4.1.3 (2002).
110 2002-03 NCAA Manual, Const., art. 4.4.1 (2002).
2002-03 NCAA Manual, Const., art. 4.1.3 (2002).
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Infractions Appeals Committee, which gives it final discretion in dealing with violations of
member institutions.1 2 The NCAA Council acts as a "board of directors" for the NCAA. 1" The
member institutions of the NCAA are also usually structured like corporations. The NCAA
generates a tremendous amount of revenue from which its member institutions can profit. The
NCAA and its member institutions are organized and controlled like corporations, from the top
down. Considering these facts it is hard to see the NCAA as anything but a corporation.
The last point of applicability is that a corporate accountability approach would create
penalty options that do not currently exist for the NCAA. Corporate accountability would widen
the spectrum of NCAA punishment to include individuals. The institution presidents and
coaches who might be tempted to cut corners or look the other way when faced with NCAA
violations would think twice if they could be individually punished. Currently the NCAA does
not motivate presidents or coaches to ensure that their programs adhere to NCAA rules. A
corporate accountability approach would require the people at the top do everything they could,
within reason, to ensure adherence. Corporate accountability would make it the duty of
presidents and coaches to know what is happening in their programs.
C. Suggestions for Corporately Aimed Penalties
As noted above, there are two major problems with current NCAA penalties: too many
innocent parties are punished, and authority figures are not deterred from committing violations.
Some simple changes to the NCAA penalty options could address both problems. The first
change the NCAA should consider is to stop using prohibition of season or post-season play.
The only time a team should be allowed to quit playing is when they cannot field a full team.
Prohibition of play is the penalty that tends to penalize innocent parties more than any other
penalty. Prohibition of play serves the purpose of penalizing the institution by taking away any
chance of post-season payouts, but the NCAA could fine institutions an amount that would equal
or outweigh any payouts the institutions might earn from post-season play.
Second, the NCAA could encourage penalties focused on institution presidents and
coaches. The NCAA is not allowed to penalize individuals at member institutions since it has
been recognized as a private entity.114 The NCAA could however, require the member
institutions to punish presidents and coaches more severely. More severe penalties could include
fines directed at presidents, coaches or any authority figure involved in a violation. It makes
sense to use monetary fines to oppose the monetary incentive to violate NCAA rules. For
coaches specifically, there could be a two or three-strike rule that would prevent coaches who
consistently had run programs with violations from continuing their careers in NCAA
institutions.
The last change the NCAA should consider is organizational. The NCAA should replace
institution presidents on NCAA governing bodies with unbiased leadership. This would alleviate
the above-mentioned conflict of interests for institution presidents who also work for the NCAA.
The mission of "amateurism" will be best served if the NCAA applies effective
regulations and penalties to its member institutions. NCAA penalties currently discount a key
factor of compliance. The key factor is the accountability of authority figures within each
member institution. The NCAA has been criticized of imitating discipline and being motivated
112 d
113 Broyles, supra note 24 (discussing problems with NCAA regulatory procedures).
114 National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 195-196 (1988).
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to achieve integrity in college sports only for commercial reasons. The best way for the
NCAA to change these perceptions and support the NCAA mission is to implement the
substantial reforms noted above.
VI. CONCLUSION
Georgia and Fresno State basketball players missed the post-season last year. Jim
Harrick, Georgia's coach, and Jerry Tarkanian, Fresno State's coach, are no longer running the
basketball programs that they left in disorder less than a year ago. Both coaches are retired for
the time being. Michael Adams, president of Georgia, and John Welty, president of Fresno
State, have not and will not receive penalties under the current NCAA penalty options.
The NCAA will continue to generate revenue in the billions of dollars and all the member
institutions of the NCAA will continue to compete for millions of dollars in payouts. As
commercialism increases and profits rise, the motivation to defraud the system will also increase.
In a commercially competitive atmosphere, the NCAA's mission of "amateurism" will always be
in jeopardy unless the NCAA introduces reforms to safeguard it. The NCAA must initiate any
change, since the courts are currently deferring to the NCAA's. Corporate accountability offers
a suitable path for NCAA reform by effectively penalizing authority figures. If the NCAA hopes
to restore and maintain purity in collegiate athletics, it will have to refocus its penalty process to
include and effectively deter institution presidents and coaches.
188
115 Eytcheson, supra note 11.
